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utbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) have resulted in increased discussion about
community-based infection control measures, including
voluntary quarantine. In the 2003 SARS outbreak in
Toronto, Canada, at least 23,000 persons participated in
voluntary quarantine in their homes because of possible
exposure (1). Quarantined persons were told to remain at
home, not allow anyone to visit, wear a mask when in the
same room as other members of the household, and sleep
in a separate room (2). These protocols were developed to
decrease the risk of transmitting the SARS coronavirus to
persons in the household. This situation highlights 1 aspect
of community-based quarantine that has been overlooked:
the potential role of household pets in disease transmis-
sion. 
When SARS was first identified, potential host animal
species were unknown, as was the risk of transmission
between animals and humans. Despite the severity of
SARS, the lack of information on the potential for inter-
species transmission, and the potential implications of ani-
mals acting as reservoirs of infection, we are unaware of
quarantine protocols that consider household pets. No spe-
cific data are available on pet ownership by quarantined
persons; however, based on the prevalence of pet owner-
ship in Canada, we assume that thousands of quarantined
persons had household pets. Whether any precautions were
taken to reduce the risk of SARS transmission to pets is
unclear. Presumably, household pets had prolonged close
contact with many quarantined persons. Additionally,
many of these pets may have had close contact with other
persons, both inside and outside the home, and contact
with other animals. We now know that domestic cats and
ferrets are susceptible to experimental infection by the
SARS coronavirus and that they can transmit this virus to
other cats and ferrets (3). What would have happened if
cats were naturally infected in households and could trans-
mit infection to humans or other animals? Were measures
in place to reduce the risk for this transmission and detect
it had it occurred? If SARS had established itself in the
feral cat population in affected cities, would it have been
controllable?
Although SARS is the most recent example of an
emerging disease for which quarantine was implemented,
the potential for household transmission through pets
should be considered in any new disease when information
is incomplete regarding potential hosts and the risk for
interspecies transmission. If one considers that an estimat-
ed 75% of transmissible emerging diseases are zoonoses
(4), the relevance becomes clear. 
While most of the discussion of zoonoses has focused
on food-producing animals and wildlife, companion ani-
mals require closer scrutiny because of the number of per-
sons exposed to pets and the nature of human-animal
interaction. Pets are present in ≈58.3% of households in
the United States; the pet population includes ≈62 million
dogs, ≈69 million cats, ≈10 million birds, and ≈3 million
reptiles (5). Also included are smaller numbers of ferrets,
rabbits, rats, hamsters, hedgehogs, and other small mam-
mals and exotic species. Many, if not most, owners of
household pets likely have more prolonged and close con-
tact with their pets than with most other persons. Ample
reports exist regarding transmission of bacterial, viral, and
fungal pathogens between humans and pets (in both direc-
tions) in the household (6–11). In addition to SARS, some
pathogens that have recently been identified as of concern
include methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (12),
monkeypox (6), and H5N1 influenza (13). Although trans-
mission of pathogens from domestic pets often focuses on
the household, many other persons also have regular or
sporadic contact with household pets owned by friends or
family or through animal visitation programs.
Development of community-based quarantine proto-
cols that consider the role of domestic animals in transmis-
sion of disease remains a gap in current preparedness
planning activities. We believe that the potential role of
household pets should be considered in transmission of all
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ly and thoroughly evaluating the susceptibility of pets of
various species to clinical disease and subclinical infection
and assessing the possibility of transmission of pathogens
between humans and pets, in both directions. Community-
based quarantine measures may need to address contin-
gency protocols for placing household pets in quarantine
as well as human family members. Among the factors that
need to be evaluated are the following: when pets should
be quarantined, what type of unprotected animal-human
contact should be allowed, what types of outdoor access by
pets should be allowed (if any), what infection control
measures should be implemented in the household to
decrease the risk of pathogen transmission, how pet fecal
material should be handled in the household and outdoors
and in community settings, and what measures should be
taken when and if veterinary care is required. Additionally,
clinical and epidemiologic studies involving household
pets may be indicated during the emergence of infectious
diseases to evaluate the potential role of pets in disease
transmission, to help manage disease in pets, and to deter-
mine whether pets may act as sentinel species. 
We recommend that a coordinated effort between the
human and veterinary medical fields and public health
authorities be undertaken to address these issues. Relevant
groups would involve national or regional regulatory bod-
ies, public health agencies, infection control specialists in
the human and veterinary fields, veterinary organizations,
primary care veterinarians, laboratory animal veterinari-
ans, comparative medicine specialists, and humane society
personnel. Because of the number of groups that should be
included and the potential complexity of the situation,
proactive planning is needed.
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